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1. INTRODUCTION 
Merger control, which forms part of competition law, is conducted by competition 
authorities to prevent the lessening of competition or an emergence of a 
dominant player in the relevant market. The analysis of mergers focuses on the 
effects of the consolidation of business and firms.1 Unlike most of competition 
law, which becomes operative after an act prohibited by it is committed, merger 
control is preventative in nature as it seeks to prevent a structural restraint 
against competition prior to its occurrence and therefore requires an ex ante 
assessment of the possible effects of consolidation on the performance of 
markets and firms. During the review process, competition authorities consider a 
range of issues including some that form part of the country’s industrial or social 
policy. Merger control laws give competition authorities the ability to assess and 
remedy the potential anti-competitive effects of a merger, thereby preserving 
competitive market structure and benefiting consumers.2 Some of the issues 
taken into account include the lessening of competition in the market, the likely 
adverse effects on consumers as well as domestic firms, the employment 
consequences, the preservation of national champions and international 
competitiveness.3 While some of these issues are competition law 
considerations, others are non-competition factors and are considered to be 
public interest grounds. Such grounds are contentious.   
‘I've come to treat our task in dealing with public interest in much the 
same way that I treat my mad uncle, in much the same way that 
every family treats its mad uncle – with wary respect. We may try 
and ignore him; we may even deny his existence. But he somehow 
manages to turn up, invited or not, at every major family event. For 
the most part he turns out to be quite an amiable, agreeable old 
chap, but he does have the potential to behave in a very 
unpredictable manner, one that causes severe embarrassment to a 
smug, complacent family, often threatening to tear it apart and 
reduce its reputation and standing in the society at large. He is 
nevertheless often respected by the younger members of the family, 
                                                 
1 Joseph Wilson International Competition Law Series: Globalization and the Limits of National Merger 
Control Laws Volume 10 (2003) 44.  
2 Joseph Wilson International Competition Law Series: Globalization and the Limits of National Merger 
Control Laws Volume 10 (2003) 46.  
3 Joseph Wilson International Competition Law Series: Globalization and the Limits of National Merger 
Control Laws Volume 10 (2003) 44 – 45.  
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who feel that he has insights about the real world lacking in the 
more staid leaders of the family’ 4 
David Lewis' treatment of public interest is echoed by the recent Wal-
Mart/Massmart merger5 debate. Briefly stated, the merger of these two entities 
would undoubtedly promote consumer welfare through a lower price structure 
and, further, would not result in an increase of Massmart's share in the market, 
a traditional competition law ground for prohibition. Therefore, the question often 
posed is why, then, did public interest play such a leading role in this case? The 
debate sparked by this controversial case indicates the very many conflicting 
views on the application of public interest criteria to merger cases in South 
Africa, and globally. This paper will seek to examine the role of public interest in 
competition law by critically analyzing South African competition legislation, the 
most recent case law on the subject, with specific focus on the Wal-
Mart/Massmart decision, and comparing the South African competition law's 
approach to public interest considerations with developed as well as developing 
countries and the potential effect such considerations might have on investment 
into South Africa. The paper seeks to argue the question of whether public 
interest objectives should have weight in merger control and, if so, how far can 
these considerations extend into realms beyond competition law?  
 
2. HISTORY OF PUBLIC INTEREST 
In South Africa’s burgeoning democracy, and having regard to its particular 
history and contemporary economic circumstances, there was a particular need 
for new competition legislation. Given the character of South Africa’s new 
political regime and the presence of labour in the process of formulating the new 
law, there was little prospect of excluding critical factors such as employment 
and the racially skewed ownership structures from the ambit of an important 
piece of legislation, being the Competition Act. As such, any disregard for major 
public-interest issues at that time would have led to a loss of credibility in the 
                                                 
4 Lewis, D. 2002.The Role of Public Interest in Merger Evaluation. Paper presented at the Merger Working 
Group, International Competition Network. 28 – 29 September 2002. Naples. 1 – 4. Available at 
http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/Speeches/lewis5.pdf, accessed on 12 September 2012. 
5 110/CAC/Jul11 and 111/CAC/Jun11.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
6 
 
eyes of the public. The South African government recognised that the 
competition policy it wished to develop also needed to align with broader 
government policies and objectives of redress and development. Therefore, if 
these factors could not fit neatly into an orthodox competition statute, then they 
would enter by way of the introduction of public interest criteria.6 In this way, the 
South African Competition Act differed from those in other jurisdictions by 
including public-interest objectives as part and parcel of the assessment of 
competition issues rather than keeping them as a separate consideration.  
The introduction of the public interest criteria into South African merger review 
attracted a vast amount of attention and aroused controversy. While the 
government at the time was looking to create a comprehensive framework that 
would achieve a competitive and fast-growing economy7, many South African 
businesses appeared to experience difficulty in grasping the ‘nettle of merger 
review in any shape or form’.8 It was viewed as an unwelcome political 
intervention in an important area of business decision-making. However, despite 
its controversial nature, it was recognised that no major piece of socio-economic 
legislation would have passed muster without incorporating job creation and 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) into the overall objectives of the policy 
and statute. However, it has been argued that this did not necessarily mean that 
these objectives had to be included in the criteria for evaluating mergers, but 
once the unions grasped the concept, there was, in the prevailing political and 
economic climate, no way that these objectives were going to be denied.9 
Competition policy was thus seen as something that should be complementary 
to efforts to improve employment, support emerging entrepreneurs, particularly 
those from historically disadvantaged backgrounds, and enhance consumer 
transparency.10 
                                                 
6 D Lewis Thieves at the Dinner Table (2012) 41.  
7 J. Hodge et al ‘Public interest provisions in the South African Competition Act: A critical review’ in The 
Development of Competition Law & Economics in South Africa (edited by K. Moodaliyar and S. Roberts) 
(2012) at page 3.  
8 D Lewis Thieves at the Dinner Table (2012) 95. 
9 D Lewis Thieves at the Dinner Table (2012) 118.  
10 J. Hodge et al ‘Public interest provisions in the South African Competition Act: A critical review’ in The 
Development of Competition Law & Economics in South Africa (edited by K. Moodaliyar and S. Roberts) 
(2012) at page 4. 
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At the time of its introduction, it was at the international level that the inclusion of 
public interest factors into merger review generated the greatest controversy. 
However, currently, it appears that in mature competition jurisdictions, a public 
interest test is applied only in the case of cross-border acquisitions, being 
acquisitions of domestic firms by foreign-owned firms. The unusual element of 
South African competition law was not that public interest or non-competition 
issues played a part in deciding whether to approve a merger, but that the public 
interest criteria were incorporated into the South African Competition Act and 
that they applied to all mergers as distinct from only cross-border mergers. 
Another novel feature of the South African Competition Act is that it placed the 
responsibility for public interest decisions at the hands of independent 
competition authorities, rather than with government agencies, with the hope 
that this would limit the scope for political interference.11   
 
3. LEGISLATION – section 12A of the Competition Act, 89 of 1998.  
The public interest provisions in South Africa's Competition Act, 89 of 1998, 
("the Competition Act") are dealt with in section 12A. The relevant provisions are 
set out below:  
12A. Consideration of mergers 
(1)  Whenever required to consider a merger, the Competition Commission or 
Competition Tribunal must initially determine whether or not the merger is 
likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, by assessing the 
factors set out in subsection (2), and- 
(a)  if it appears that the merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen 
competition, then determine- 
(i)  whether or not the merger is likely to result in any technological, 
efficiency or other pro-competitive gain which will be greater 
than, and offset, the effects of any prevention or lessening of 
competition, that may result or is likely to result from the merger, 
and would not likely be obtained if the merger is prevented; and 
                                                 
11 J. Hodge et al ‘Public interest provisions in the South African Competition Act: A critical review’ in The 
Development of Competition Law & Economics in South Africa (edited by K. Moodaliyar and S. Roberts) 
(2012) at page 5. 
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(ii) whether the merger can or cannot be justified on substantial 
public interest grounds by assessing the factors set out in 
subsection (3); or 
(b)  otherwise, determine whether the merger can or cannot be justified 
on substantial public interest grounds by assessing the factors set out 
in subsection (3). 
Section 12A(2) provides that when determining whether or not a merger is likely 
to substantially prevent or lessen competition, the competition authorities must 
assess the strength of competition in the relevant market, and the probability 
that the firms in the market after the merger will behave competitively or co-
operatively, taking into account any factor that is relevant to competition in that 
market, including the following –  
i) the actual and potential level of import competition in the market; 
ii) the ease of entry into the market, including tariff and regulatory barriers; 
iii) the level and trends of concentration, and history of collusion, in the 
market; 
iv) the degree of countervailing power in the market; 
v) the dynamic characteristics of the market, including growth, innovation, 
and product differentiation; 
vi) the nature and extent of vertical integration in the market; 
vii) whether the business or part of the business of a party to the merger or 
proposed merger has failed or is likely to fail; and 
viii) whether the merger will result in the removal of an effective competitor.  
Section 12A(3) provides that when determining whether a merger can or cannot 
be justified on public interest grounds, the Competition Commission or the 
Competition Tribunal must consider the effect that the merger will have on –  
(a)  a particular industrial sector or region; 
(b)  employment; 
(c)  the ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically 
disadvantaged persons, to become competitive; and 
(d)  the ability of national industries to compete in international markets. 
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Therefore, as can be construed from the legislation, section 12A(3), read 
together with section 12A(1), provides that the initial consideration of the merger 
must consist of an examination of whether the merger is likely to substantially 
prevent or lessen competition by an examination of the factors set out in section 
12A(2). Once that enquiry has been completed, and if it then appears that the 
merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, a determination 
must be made whether or not the merger is likely to result in any technological, 
efficiency or other pro-competitive gain, which will be greater than the losses, 
and thus offset the effects of the prevention or lessening of competition that has 
already been found to exist pursuant to the initial enquiry. Further, and 
irrespective of the findings in relation to these considerations, the competition 
authorities must consider whether the merger can or cannot be justified on 
substantial public interest grounds.  As the legislation provides, the competition 
authorities first need to examine the effect of the merger transaction on 
competition itself and, thereafter, its effect on specified public interest factors. 
Section 12A(1)(b) expressly mandates the competition authorities to assess the 
effect of a merger on specified public interest grounds.  
In practise, only two sets of public interest grounds have generally surfaced 
before the competition authorities when conducting merger control proceedings. 
These two grounds are the employment impact and the promotion of BEE. In 
regards to the employment impact, generally the argument would be a plea for 
turning down or imposing conditions on a merger which, while acceptable in 
competition grounds, is likely to lead to job losses. For the promotion of BEE, 
the argument would usually be for approving a merger that might not pass 
muster on competition grounds, but that nevertheless carries sufficient promise 
of black economic empowerment, thus justifying the merger.12 In essence, the 
provisions of section 12A envisage three separate, but interrelated inquiries, 
namely:  
i) whether or not the merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen 
competition; 
                                                 
12 D Lewis Thieves at the Dinner Table (2012) 117.  
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ii) if the result of this inquiry is in the affirmative, whether technological, 
efficiency or other pro-competitive gains will trump the initial conclusion 
so reached in stage one, together with the further consideration based on 
substantial public interest grounds which, in turn, could justify permitting 
or refusing the merger; and 
iii) notwithstanding the outcome of the above two enquiries, the 
determination of whether the merger can or cannot be justified on public 
interest grounds.13  
Unlike the efficiency test, the public interest test is undertaken regardless of the 
finding of the merger’s impact on competition. In essence, the process requires 
the competition authorities to weigh the effects that the merger will have on 
competition against its effects on the public interest factors specified in section 
12A(3). However, the Competition Act is silent on how this balance should be 
attained.14 Many other African jurisdictions have given similar mandates to their 
competition authorities and the decision of the South African Competition 
Appeal Court in the Wal-Mart/Massmart decision has continent-wide relevance. 
The transaction required competition approval in six African countries and was 
approved without substantial conditions being imposed in four of the six 
countries. While there were some regulatory complications in Namibia, the most 
significant challenge was the South African competition legislation and the 
opposition by the government and the various trade unions.15 The case is 
outlined and discussed more fully below.  
 
4. WAL-MART / MASSMART: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
The primary acquiring firm Wal-Mart, being the largest retailer in the world, 
announced its intention to acquire a 51% shareholding in Massmart, a local 
wholesaler and retailer of grocery, liquor and general merchandise, on 27 
September 2010. The acquisition was immediately seen as controversial and 
                                                 
13 110/CAC/Jul11 and 111/CAC/Jun11 Judgment of 9 March 2012 at para [11] – [12].  
14 Nkomo, M. & van Wyk, M. 2012. Public Interest Criteria in Mergers – Protectionist Measures? Sixth 
Annual Competition Law, Economics and Policy Conference in South Africa. 6 – 7 September 2012. 3.   
15 D Rudman ‘Wal-Mart’s expansion into Africa focuses attention on public interest’, 9 May 2012, available 
at 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/176348/Antitrust+Competition/WalMarts+Expansion+Into+Africa+Focuses+Atte
ntion+On+Public+Interest, accessed on 12 September 2012.  
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the debate has been characterised by criticism against Wal-Mart’s reputation 
among labour unions, the involvement of government and over-reaching of 
public policy in competition matters. The Competition Commission initially 
recommended that the merger be approved unconditionally. This 
recommendation was challenged at the Competition Tribunal by various labour 
unions who opposed the merger on public interest grounds. These labour 
unions included the South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers 
Union (SACCAWU), Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), Food 
and Allied Workers Union (FAWU), National Union of Metal Workers in South 
Africa (NUMSA), the South African Clothing Textile Workers Union (SACTWU) 
and the South African Small Medium and Micro Enterprise Forum. The Tribunal 
granted a delay in the hearing process to allow more time for three government 
departments to make submissions. Although no competition concerns were 
identified in the transaction, public interest concerns were raised in terms of 
section 12A(3) by the various trade unions. The public interest concerns raised 
were the effects that the merger would have on employment, distribution and 
retail sectors, and the ability of small businesses or firms, controlled by 
historically disadvantaged persons, to become competitive.16 Interestingly, the 
Minister of Economic Development intervened in the matter and his stated 
concern was not merely with the direct consequences of the merger, but rather 
with the prospect that Wal-Mart would substitute imported goods for South 
African products in its newly acquired stores. Therefore the Minister advocated 
for a commitment from the merged entity that it would maintain local 
procurement at the same levels as Massmart, being the South African target 
entity. Effectively the Minister was demanding the imposition of a local 
procurement quota and Wal-Mart made it clear that it would not willingly submit 
to this condition if imposed.17 Another important element in the Minister’s 
intervention is that he chose to enter into private negotiations with the merging 
firms, and not make submissions to the Commission’s investigators. In so doing, 
he indirectly held out the promise that if the firms were to reach agreement with 
                                                 
16 Nkomo, M. & van Wyk, M. 2012. Public Interest Criteria in Mergers – Protectionist Measures? Sixth 
Annual Competition Law, Economics and Policy Conference in South Africa. 6 – 7 September 2012. 3.     
17 D Lewis Thieves at the Dinner Table (2012) 133.  
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him, he would ensure that the agreement would be approved by the competition 
authorities.18  
The Tribunal approved the merger in May 2011, after hearing evidence from 
both the merging parties and the opponents to such merger, and after finding 
that the transaction did not prevent or lessen competition in any of the markets 
in which Massmart operated. However, conditions, which were tendered 
voluntarily by the merging parties, were imposed together with the approval. The 
conditions addressed the public interest concerns raised by the government and 
the unions in opposing the merger and were primarily focused on the 
employment and procurement issues. The government and the unions 
challenged the Tribunal's approval before the Competition Appeal Court (CAC), 
but for different reasons.19 The most relevant for this paper was SACCAWU’s 
appeal to the CAC based on the criticism of the normative approach adopted by 
the Tribunal to the application of the Competition Act. SACCAWU contended 
that the approach adopted by the Tribunal ignored the express language of the 
Competition Act and that the South African competition regime is concerned 
with ‘economic or market power, its creation, extension, distribution and 
(ab)use, and that the entry of a firm with the scale of operations and consequent 
economic power of Wal-Mart into the South African economy will disrupt the 
competitive equilibrium and processes in the retail sector, as well as alter 
competition for suppliers in the retail supply chain’.20 SACCAWU, therefore, 
contended that the merging parties’ adoption of the perspective of the consumer 
welfare standard wholly ignores its explicit rejection by the Competition Act. 
SACCAWU recommended that section 12A directs the competition authorities to 
take account of factors which do not play a role in terms of the consumer 
welfare approach to competition policy and that section 12A makes it clear that 
the analysis, as required by the Competition Act, enjoins the competition 
                                                 
18 D Lewis Thieves at the Dinner Table (2012) 133 – 134.  
19 D Rudman ‘Wal-Mart’s expansion into Africa focuses attention on public interest’, 12 May 2012, available 
at 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/176348/Antitrust+Competition/WalMarts+Expansion+Into+Africa+Focuses+Atte
ntion+On+Public+Interest, accessed on 12 September 2012. 
20 110/CAC/Jul11 and 111/CAC/Jun11 Judgment of 9 March 2012 at para [91]. 
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authority to undertake an examination of factors beyond standard questions of a 
contemplated transaction’s impact on price and output. 21  
In light of SACCAWU’s contentions outlined above, the CAC raised the question 
as to what weight is to be given to the factors set out in section 12A(3) in order 
to determine whether these should trump a finding based on more traditional 
considerations of consumer welfare as provided for in section 12A(2).22 The 
CAC held that the Competition Act mandates the authorities to weigh up the 
competition effects of the merger against the public interest harm. The court 
found that a merger can be prohibited on public interest grounds only when the 
merger would lead to substantial public interest harm.23 Where the public 
interest harm is not sufficient to justify prohibition of the merger, it will still need 
to be measured to determine whether or not conditions should be imposed on 
the merger approval, and if so, the extent of such conditions. Therefore, 
evidence of public interest harm is crucial in determining whether or not a 
merger should be set aside for the reason of substantial negative effects on 
public interest. 
Although the CAC found that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that 
the merger's effect on Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises and employment 
was sufficient to prohibit such a merger, the CAC partly upheld the appeal as it 
found that there were legitimate concerns which justified the imposition of 
conditions. However, the CAC found that the existing conditions imposed by the 
Tribunal were insufficient and therefore made additions to them. In summary, 
the CAC agreed with the imposition of employment conditions and extended 
them by ordering a study to be conducted by three experts appointed by 
SACCAWU, the government and the merging parties to assist the CAC in 
framing a supplier-development condition. The CAC concluded that in dealing 
with a standard that seeks to weigh up the competition assessment against the 
public interest assessment, it is highly unlikely that the prohibition of the merger 
could be justified based on public interest grounds. However, the CAC 
acknowledged that in such circumstances, the public interest harm was not 
                                                 
21 110/CAC/Jul11 and 111/CAC/Jun11 Judgment of 9 March 2012 at para [92] and [93]. 
22 110/CAC/Jul11 and 111/CAC/Jun11 Judgment of 9 March 2012 at para [99].  
23 110/CAC/Jul11 and 111/CAC/Jun11 Judgment of 9 March 2012 at para [114]. 
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irrelevant by upholding the imposition of conditions on such merger.24 The 
conditions imposed in terms of the order were the following: 
1) the merged entity must ensure that there are no retrenchments, based on 
the merged entity’s operational requirements resulting from the merger, 
for a period of two years from the effective date of the transaction; 
2) the merged entity is required to reinstate the 503 employees who were 
retrenched in 2009 and June 2010 (such retrenchments were found to be 
related to the merger itself); 
3) the merged entity must honour existing labour agreements and must not 
challenge SACCAWU’s position to represent the bargaining units for at 
least three years from the effective date of the transaction; and 
4) the merged entity must commission a study to determine the most 
appropriate means by which local South African suppliers may be 
empowered to respond to the challenges posed by the merger, and thus 
benefit from it.  
In October 2012, the CAC released its final judgment based on its previous 
order that the merged entity must commission a study to determine the most 
appropriate means, together with a mechanism, by which local South African 
suppliers may be empowered to respond to the challenges posed by the merger 
and benefit from it. The CAC examined the reports compiled by the experts and 
ordered the merged entity to establish a fund within four months of the order. 
Such fund was ordered to comply with various requirements, and amongst 
others, one requirement is that Massmart must ‘contribute a maximum amount 
of R200 million to the fund over the duration of the fund, which shall be for five 
years’.25 Further, the CAC ruled that Massmart should design and propose 
projects to an advisory board for its advice and recommendation. The advisory 
board may then advise Massmart to consider particular projects for design and 
proposal to the board.  
 
                                                 
24 D Rudman ‘Wal-Mart’s expansion into Africa focuses attention on public interest’, 12 May 2012, available 
at 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/176348/Antitrust+Competition/WalMarts+Expansion+Into+Africa+Focuses+Atte
ntion+On+Public+Interest, accessed on 12 September 2012.  
25 110/CAC/Jul11 and 111/CAC/Jun11 Judgment of 9 October 2012 at para [49]. 
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5. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
Turning the focus away from the Wal-Mart/Massmart case, to an examination of 
other recent cases containing public interest considerations, which have come 
before the Tribunal, reveals an interesting trend of the South African competition 
authorities. One such case is Metropolitan Holdings Limited and Momentum 
Group Limited26, decided in 2010. The Tribunal conditionally approved the 
acquisition by Metropolitan of 100% of the ordinary issued share capital of 
Momentum. The Tribunal first assessed the competitive effects of the merger 
and concluded that it was unlikely to substantially prevent or lessen competition 
in any relevant market. However, the merger gave rise to a public interest 
consideration in the form of loss of employment. The merging parties submitted 
that the merger might lead up to approximately 1000 job losses as a result of 
redundancies and the need to improve efficiencies in the post-merger entity. 
The Tribunal approved the merger subject to a limited moratorium on 
retrenchments for two years with terms that clarified the conditions on the 
merged entity. It was the Tribunal’s view that any negative impact on public 
interest factors cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without establishing a clear 
connection between the envisaged negative impact and the claimed efficiencies. 
Further, it was emphasised that even if a negative impact on employment can 
be connected to a particular claimed efficiency, this does not release the parties 
from their duty to show that the employment losses can be justified for a reason 
that is public in nature to offset the public interest in preserving jobs as a result 
of the merger.  
The Kansai/Freeworld merger was another example of a merger in which the 
Competition Commission imposed significant conditions relating to public 
interest considerations. In Kansai Paint Co. Limited and Freeworld Coatings 
Limited27, decided in 2011, the Commission approved the hostile takeover by 
Kansai, a coatings manufacturer, of Freeworld, a manufacturer and distributor of 
decorative and performance coatings, subject to a number of welfare and public 
interest conditions that included the condition of the prohibition of merger related 
                                                 
26 41/LM/Jul10.  
27 53/AM/Jul11. 
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retrenchments for a period of three years as well as the requirement that Kansai 
implement a Black Economic Empowerment deal within two years of the 
approval of the merger.28 Framed as forming part of the competition authorities’ 
statutory mandate to consider public interest grounds in terms of section 12A(3) 
of the Competition Act, the latter condition raised many questions regarding the 
ambit of the public interest grounds that properly fall to be considered by the 
competition authorities.29  
As demonstrated by the case law above, a marked increase in public interest 
considerations has taken place in South Africa in recent years. In the first ten 
years of the Competition Act, public interest considerations have not been of a 
great concern in the vast majority of transactions and South Africa saw 
sustained economic growth during this time. It is only very recently, in a period 
of temporary recession and substantial job losses, that public interest issues are 
becoming more and more prevalent and the competition authorities 
interpretation thereof more contested.30 What, then, is the approach of other 
jurisdictions? A brief study of public interest considerations in international 
merger control regimes demonstrates that a number of countries do give weight 
to public interest considerations, however, this is strictly limited to certain 
sectors and the general trend is to move away from placing considerable weight 
onto such issues and to rather focus on pure competition law objectives in 
merger control.  
5.1 United States and Canada 
It is submitted that in the first half of the 20th century, competition law in the 
United States was used to address an indefinite range of concerns, such as the 
level of employment, the redistribution of wealth and the spreading of business 
opportunities among a large number of firms.31 By the end of the 1970s, the 
                                                 
28 Boshoff, W, Dingley D & Dingley, J. 2012. The Economics of Public Interest Provisions in South African 
Competition Policy. Sixth Annual Competition Law, Economics and Policy Conference in South Africa. 6 – 
7 September 2012. 7.  
29 Avidon, C & Azzarito, C. 2012. ‘Being pushed to promote government policies’. Without Prejudice. 
February 2012.  
30 J. Hodge et al ‘Public interest provisions in the South African Competition Act: A critical review’ in The 
Development of Competition Law & Economics in South Africa (edited by K. Moodaliyar and S. Roberts) 
(2012) at page 10. 
31 Odudu, O. 2010. The Wider Concerns of Competition Law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (Vol. 30, No. 
3). 599 – 613 at 599.   
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United States antitrust laws were, to many observers, too robust. US 
Competition law prohibited many ‘normal’ business transactions by over-
expanding in favour of helping the underdog and dispersing power.32 Judge 
Frank Easterbrook articulated the result of such when he wrote, ‘When 
everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive’.33  The 1980s ushered in an era of 
conservatism, led by the Reagan administration, and this new administration set 
about to cut back the law that regulated business in the United States.34 As a 
result of this, competition law in the United States changed and the focus shifted 
entirely to consumer welfare and legitimate efficiency.  
‘The victory of Chicago School was more a victory of economic 
libertarianism than a victory of consumers; ‘consumer welfare’ was 
merely the label given for the raison d'être of the new regime. 
Freedom of business was the victor; especially f the large firms 
that has been treated with suspicion. Aggregate consumer welfare 
was a limiting principle to protect the freedom of business while 
acknowledging the existence of the law… By the end of the 
twentieth century, there was a considerable range for manoeuvre in 
claiming that exclusionary conduct met the test of harming 
consumer welfare and therefore deserved to be called anti-
competitive’.35  
In the United States and Canada, public interest in mergers has mainly focused 
on mergers in the media and banking sectors respectively. Competition 
authorities in both countries have no public interest encumbrance when 
assessing mergers with the exception of these two sectors.36 In recent years, 
United States merger analysis has become increasingly well-grounded in 
economics and the focus has been directed solely on the protection of 
consumer welfare. The United States competition authorities focus on whether 
the merger is likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise.37  
                                                 
32 Eleanor M. Fox ‘What is harm to competition?’ Antitrust, exclusionary practices, and the elusive notion of 
anticompetitive effect’ (2001) LexisNexis, at 2.  
33 Easterbrook, F. 1984. The Limits of Antitrust. Texas Law Review Journal (Vol. 63, No.1).1 – 40. 12.  
34 Eleanor M. Fox ‘What is harm to competition?’ Antitrust, exclusionary practices, and the elusive notion of 
anticompetitive effect’ (2001) LexisNexis, at 2.  
35 Eleanor M. Fox ‘What is harm to competition?’ Antitrust, exclusionary practices, and the elusive notion of 
anticompetitive effect’ (2001) LexisNexis, at 2 – 3.  
36 Njisane, Y. 2011. The rise of Public Interest: Recent high profile mergers. Public Interest Law Gathering. 
1 – 24. 17.  
37 International Competition Network: Mergers Working Group ‘Description of Analytical Framework under 
United States Merger Law. 2002 Naples Conference. 21. 
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In Canada, non-competition issues, such as industrial policy or labour policy 
issues, are not taken into account by the Canadian Competition Bureau in its 
merger control review of merger transactions, unless such policies form a 
barrier to entry into the market. However, case precedent obliges the 
Competition Bureau to consider all of the purposes of the Canadian Competition 
Act when taking into account the extent of the anti-competitive effects and 
whether they may be offset and outweighed by merger-related efficiencies, and 
due regard has been taken to ensure that Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises 
("SMMEs") have an equitable opportunity to participate in the Canadian 
economy.38   
5.2 European Union 
There are two levels of merger control in Europe. The first is the European 
Union merger control for certain transactions with a ‘community dimension’, 
which fall within the jurisdiction of the European Commission under the EU 
Merger Regulation, Council Regulation No. 139/2004. The second is national 
merger control for those transactions which do not meet the European Union 
Merger Regulation criteria, but nevertheless qualify for investigation under the 
national laws of Member States. All European Union Member States have 
national merger control laws, with the exception of Luxembourg. Within the 
European Union of 27 Member States, the European Commission has exclusive 
jurisdiction over ‘concentrations with a community dimension’. Generally, 
transactions which are subject to notification to, and clearance by, the European 
Commission under the European Union Merger Regulation are not subject to 
parallel merger inquiries under the national merger control provisions of the 
various Member States. However, there are provisions which allow for parallel 
inquiries in certain limited circumstances.39  
The European Commission, which is termed a super-national competition 
agency, has various Council Regulations, termed Merger Regulations. The 
Merger Regulations grant the European Commission the exclusive jurisdiction to 
                                                 
38 The European Lawyer Reference (Van Bael & Bellis). 2011. Merger Control. London, United Kingdom. 
122.  
39 Ashurst LLP Quickguides ‘EU Merger Control’, January 2012, available at 
www.ashurst.com/doc.aspx?id_Resource=4629, accessed on 9 June 2013.  
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decide on mergers, or ‘concentrations which have a community dimension’. The 
Commission appraises a concentration with a view to ascertaining whether it 
creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective 
competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a 
substantial part of it.40 The Commission must take various factors into account: 
i) the need to preserve and develop effective competition within the common 
market; ii) actual or potential competition from the European community or from 
around the world; iii) market position of the undertakings and their economic and 
financial power; iv) access of suppliers and users to supplies and markets; v) 
legal or other barriers to entry; vi) supply and demand trends for the relevant 
goods; vii) the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers; and viii) the 
development of technical and economic progress, provided that it is to the 
consumers’ advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition.41  
All the factors which the Commission is required to take into account in 
appraising a merger, save for one, are based purely on competition law. The 
consideration of the development of technical and economic progress is a non-
competition law ground and is considered to be an industrial policy ground. 
Such examples are the prevention of a foreign company from acquiring a 
controlling interest in a key European community company, preventing a merger 
that would lead to considerable unemployment in the European community, or 
creating a European champion to revive a declining European community 
industry or to compete effectively with a foreign competitor.42 However, the 
GE/Honeywell merger case set out below has led to major criticism of the EU 
merger control regime.  
5.3 GE/Honeywell merger discussion  
General Electric was the world’s largest producer of large and small jet engines 
for commercial and military aircraft. Honeywell was a leading firm in the 
production of avionics, including navigation equipment, certain non-avionic 
                                                 
40 Joseph Wilson International Competition Law Series: Globalization and the Limits of National Merger 
Control Laws Volume 10 (2003) 159 – 160.  
41 Joseph Wilson International Competition Law Series: Globalization and the Limits of National Merger 
Control Laws Volume 10 (2003) 160.  
42 Joseph Wilson International Competition Law Series: Globalization and the Limits of National Merger 
Control Laws Volume 10 (2003) 160.  
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products, engines for corporate jets and engine starters. General Electric and 
Honeywell agreed to merge in what would have been the largest industrial 
merger in history. The European Commission declared in July 2001 that the 
merger between General Electric and Honeywell was ‘incompatible with the 
common market’ according to the Merger Regulations. The decision was 
appealed by the merging parties to the Court of First Instance which, in 
December 2005, decided to uphold it. This thwarted merger stands out as the 
only merger between US companies to be derailed solely by the European 
competition authorities, while being cleared by the US Department of Justice 
and 11 other jurisdictions.  
The European Commission declared: 
‘The combination of the two companies’ activities would have 
resulted in the creation of dominant positions in the markets for the 
supply of avionics, non-avionics and corporate jet engines, as well 
as the strengthening of GE’s existing dominant positions in jet 
engines for large commercial and large regional jets. The 
dominance would have been created or strengthened as a result of 
horizontal overlaps in some markets as well as through the 
extension of GE’s financial power and vertical integration to 
Honeywell activities and of the combination of their respective 
complimentary products. Such integration would enable the merged 
entity to leverage the respective market power of the two companies 
into the products of one another. This would have the effect of 
foreclosing competitors, thereby eliminating competition in these 
markets, ultimately affecting adversely product quality, service and 
consumers’ prices’. 43 
The European Commission effectively concluded that a more diversified, and 
thus more competitive General Electric, would somehow disadvantage other 
market participants, specifically those in the European market. Therefore the 
question has been raised as to how to define ‘the anticompetitive effect’ of 
exclusionary practices? Does the concept of anti-competitiveness only include 
provable increases in market power that will lower output and raise prices for 
consumers? Or does it go further than this and include the exclusionary impact 
on competitors of dominant firm conduct, the impact on market actors of 
coercive uses of power to deprive them of what they need for their own efficient 
                                                 
43 Eleanor M. Fox ‘What is harm to competition?’ Antitrust, exclusionary practices, and the elusive notion of 
anticompetitive effect’ (2001) LexisNexis, at 10. 
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performance, and the impact on competitors of market structures that confer on 
a dominant firm either preferred access to an important input/facility or 
leveraging?44 Could the concerns of reduced competition and higher prices for 
consumers resulting from the merger not have been eliminated by the 
imposition of certain conditions with the result that the merger could proceed? 
However, it seems that the merging parties could not come to a solution which 
met the European competition authorities’ approval.  
Although this case does not deal primarily with public interest issues, it has 
been widely held to be a clear example of the European competition authorities 
protecting the local market players and illustrates the anxiety caused in the 
consideration of a merger with the potential to swamp the relevant market and 
impede competition. Criticism of the decision has revealed opinion that the EU 
competition authorities are given enormous discretion and that under the current 
EU procedures and practices, merging firms and their legal counsel need to 
recognize the very substantial discretion enjoyed by the staff of the EU’s Merger 
Task Force and plan their approach accordingly.45 This could serve as a 
warning to the practice of competition law in South Africa and gives light to the 
potential problems that could arise if the competition authorities are given too 
much room to interpret legislation and use their own discretion in correcting the 
wrongs of South Africa’s past inequality.  
5.4 United Kingdom 
A key feature of the merger provisions in the UK’s Enterprise Act, 2002, is that 
the Secretary of State should not be involved in individual cases, and that 
decisions should be taken by the Office of Fair Trading and Competition 
Commission as the UK merger control regime follows the principle that 
competition analysis in normal merger cases should be carried out by specialist 
competition authorities. However, there may be situations in which the 
investigation of a merger may be justifiable on grounds of a wider public interest 
than its detrimental effect on competition.  
                                                 
44 Eleanor M. Fox ‘What is harm to competition?’ Antitrust, exclusionary practices, and the elusive notion of 
anticompetitive effect’ (2001) LexisNexis, at 10.  
45 D.E. Patterson & C. Shapiro, ‘Transatlantic Divergence in GE/Honeywell: Causes and Lessons’ (2001) 
available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/divergence.pdf, accessed on 08 August 2013.  
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Section 58 of the Enterprise Act provides for specified public interest 
considerations in merger control:  
1) national security; 
2) considerations in respect of media, including plurality and free expression; 
and 
3) the stability of the UK financial system.46  
However, the list may be added to in instances where the Secretary of State 
thinks a certain public interest ground ought to be specified. Section 58(3) 
provides that ‘the Secretary of State may by order modify this section for the 
purpose of specifying in this section a new consideration or removing or 
amending any consideration which is, for the time being, specified in this 
section’. Further, section 42 of the Act provides for the intervention of the 
Secretary of State in certain public interest cases. These sections were 
demonstrated in the Lloyds/HBOS merger case discussed below.  
The UK merger control regime in recent years has been an example of an 
enduring economics-based system of merger regulation. In September 2008, 
Lloyds TSB and Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) were allowed to merge into 
the Lloyds Banking Group, in a deal brokered by the UK government. For the 
first time since the Enterprise Act came into force in 2002, the UK government 
used its public interest powers to allow a merger which was opposed by the 
Office of Fair Trading on competition grounds (based on substantial lessening of 
competition in relation to personal current accounts, banking services for 
SMMEs and mortgages). In order for the merger to be allowed, the Secretary of 
State had to create a new public interest ground with the consent of Parliament. 
The Secretary of State used his power under section 42 of the Enterprise Act to 
create a new public interest ground, being ‘maintaining the stability of the UK 
financial system’ and forced the merger through on the new public interest 
ground without the Competition Commission having a chance to consider its 
implications for competition. This was done on the basis of section 45 of the Act, 
finding that the benefits of the merger for the stability of the UK financial system 
                                                 
46 The European Lawyer Reference (Van Bael & Bellis). 2011. Merger Control. London, United Kingdom. 
778. 
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outweighed the likely anti-competitive outcomes.47 It can be argued that the 
decision was misguided as it did not deal with the systematic problems that had 
become apparent at the time and created some competition problems. Due to 
the fact that the merged entity had to be bailed out by the government following 
the merger, gives reason to believe that Lloyds/HBOS failed to achieve the 
stated public interest in any event. This has led to a powerful bank with 
significantly reduced competition. The conclusion may be drawn that the 
decision to allow the Lloyds/HBOS merger prioritised short-term concerns and 
financial stability. The criticism of the case involves the point that bringing public 
interest considerations into play widens the issues of debate and will inevitably 
encourage lobbying by those who want to support their particular interests. 
Some commentators have suggested that the UK may have gone too far in 
creating an ‘unduly purist economic enforcement regime’ and the time may now 
have come to consider whether it would be beneficial to allow broader political 
interventions in merger control on non-competition grounds. Such interventions 
would also allow the government to block foreign acquisitions of British firms.48 
Merger control on purely competition grounds encourages innovation and 
efficiency, resulting in new products and lower prices while preventing the 
exercise of excessive market power. There is a growing consensus that the 
Lloyds/HBOS merger should have been blocked purely on competition grounds 
and that HBOS should have been nationalised instead.49 It has been argued 
that economics-based merger control is transparent and preferable to general 
public interest assessments, which are unpredictable and open to abuse.50  
Therefore, a return to broader political interventions on public interest grounds, 
as demonstrated in the Lloyds/HBOS case, would risk creating inconsistency in 
merger regulation and uncertainty for firms. While it might prevent some 
                                                 
47 Andreas Stephan, ‘Did Lloyds / HBOS Mark the Failure of an Enduring Economics Based System of 
Merger Regulation?’, July 2011, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1931007, 
accessed on 8 June 2013.  
48 Andreas Stephan, ‘Did Lloyds / HBOS Mark the Failure of an Enduring Economics Based System of 
Merger Regulation?’, July 2011, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1931007, 
accessed on 8 June 2013, page 2.  
49 Andreas Stephan, ‘Did Lloyds / HBOS Mark the Failure of an Enduring Economics Based System of 
Merger Regulation?’, July 2011, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1931007, 
accessed on 8 June 2013, page 14.  
50 Andreas Stephan, ‘Did Lloyds / HBOS Mark the Failure of an Enduring Economics Based System of 
Merger Regulation?’, July 2011, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1931007, 
accessed on 8 June 2013, page 1.  
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‘damaging’ mergers, it would also discourage mergers which benefit the 
economy and make it less likely that foreign firms will invest in the UK. ‘The 
unpredictable circumstances in which a public interest intervention might be 
perceived as being necessary makes it impossible to provide a satisfactory 
definition of public interest’.51 The current system in the UK, which focuses on 
competition issues only, has worked well in the past and has provided 
businesses with transparency and predictability. Public interest factors should 
remain restricted to a small number of identified industries where there is good 
reason to consider non-competition law factors.  
5.5 Australia and New Zealand 
The substantive merger control test in Australia is whether the acquisition will 
have the effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in any 
market in Australia. Section 50(3) of the Competition and Consumer Act, 2010, 
provides that the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission must 
consider the following factors: actual and potential level of import competition; 
barriers to entry; market concentration; countervailing power; acquirer’s ability to 
significantly and sustainably increase prices or profit margins post-merger; 
availability of substitutes; dynamic characteristics of the market including 
growth, innovation and product differentiation; removal of any vigorous and 
effective ‘maverick’ competitor; and the degree of vertical integration.52 The 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission generally only considers 
merger-related efficiencies if they affect the competitiveness of a market. Non-
competition issues are not taken into account by the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission when deciding whether or not to grant clearance of a 
merger. The majority of the issues taken into account in merger decisions are 
competition issues including merger efficiencies and the impact of regulation.53  
Non-competition issues rarely factor into New Zealand’s Commerce 
                                                 
51 Andreas Stephan, ‘Did Lloyds / HBOS Mark the Failure of an Enduring Economics Based System of 
Merger Regulation?’, July 2011, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1931007, 
accessed on 8 June 2013, page 15.  
52 S Henrick and W Leach ‘International Comparative Legal Guides: Australia Chapter – Merger Control 
2013’, available at http://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/merger-control/merger-control-2013/australia, 
accessed on 10 June 2013.  
53 The European Lawyer Reference (Van Bael & Bellis). 2011. Merger Control. London, United Kingdom. 
30.  
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Commission’s merger control analysis. ‘Australia and New Zealand adopt a 
more or less similar approach to public interest during merger review. They 
have a process of merger authorisation which enables firms to apply to the 
Australian Competition Tribunal and the Commerce Commission respectively for 
an approval of mergers that are deemed anti-competitive if the public benefit 
outweighs these’.54 However, New Zealand’s Commerce Act (1986) specifically 
provides that in the exercise of its powers, the Commerce Commission ‘shall 
have regard to the economic policies of the Government as transmitted in 
writing from time to time to the Commission by the relevant Minister’.55  
5.6 China 
China has incorporated specific provisions for public interest in their merger 
control regulations, but the main focus of these is whether, as a result of the 
merger, the concentration has an impact on national security.56 On the 30th of 
August 2007, China adopted its first anti-monopoly law in an effort to continue 
the modernization of its economy through fostering competition and increasing 
efficiency. The law is intended to protect free competition and consumer rights, 
as well as allow the healthy development of China’s socialist market economy.57 
Chapter I sets out the overarching principles and purposes of the law, as well as 
the basic structure and functions of enforcement authorities. Chapter II prohibits 
monopoly agreements, including prohibited conduct, price fixing and collusion to 
depress product output. Chapter III prohibits the abuse of a dominant market 
position, notably including prohibitions on selling products at ‘unfair’ prices. 
Chapter IV of the Anti-Monopoly Law governs merger control and includes the 
factors which need to be examined when determining whether or not to approve 
mergers. However it leaves the thresholds for notification to be defined by the 
                                                 
54 Njisane, Y. 2011. The rise of Public Interest: Recent high profile mergers. Public Interest Law Gathering. 
1 – 24. 16. 
55 The European Lawyer Reference (Van Bael & Bellis). 2011. Merger Control. London, United Kingdom. 
500.  
56 The European Lawyer Reference (Van Bael & Bellis). 2011. Merger Control. London, United Kingdom. 
133. 
57 Alston & Bird LLP Antitrust Advisory ‘China Adopts Landmark Anti-Monopoly Law’, 9 October 
2007,available at http://www.alston.com/Files/Publication/cacb493e-7743-4783-8720-
e9cd375d15f6/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c300dc85-5a3c-4efd-997b-
01737100445c/Chinese%20AML%20Advisory.pdf accessed on 9 June 2013.  
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State Council. Chapter V limits the ability of Chinese administrative agencies to 
hinder competition.58  
The merger review provisions set out in Article 27 are in many ways consistent 
with approaches of other jurisdictions, including consideration of the 
concentration of the market, and the market share and power of the parties to 
the transaction. However, other factors are deviations from the major 
jurisdictions.59 Article 27 provides that the Ministry of Commerce, China’s 
executive agency for competition must consider a proposed merger’s effect ‘on 
the development of the national economy’. This essentially enjoins the Ministry 
of Commerce to consider industrial policy factors during merger review.60  
Article 28 obligates the relevant authority to prohibit concentrations that ‘will or 
may eliminate or restrict market competition’. Quite notably, this factor does not 
include a requirement that such a restriction be ‘substantial’, unlike the EU 
requirement of ‘substantial lessening of competition’ in order to justify 
prohibition. Where Article 28 seems to provide a savings clause from harsh and 
literal applications, it does still add a great deal of discretion and unpredictability 
by empowering the authority to permit a transaction where its advantages 
outweigh its disadvantages, or where the concentration is ‘in harmony with the 
public interest’.61    
There has been much debate around the viability and success of the Anti-
Monopoly Law. Some commentators are of the view that the law is a major step 
in establishing a system of commercial law consistent with international norms, 
while others believe that the interpretation and application of the law may raise 
serious concerns about whether the law will, in practice, be used primarily to 
protect competition and consumer welfare in China, or whether it will be used as 
a protectionist device to favour State Owned Enterprises and privatised 
                                                 
58 Alston & Bird LLP Antitrust Advisory ‘China Adopts Landmark Anti-Monopoly Law’, 9 October 
2007,available at http://www.alston.com/Files/Publication/cacb493e-7743-4783-8720-
e9cd375d15f6/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c300dc85-5a3c-4efd-997b-
01737100445c/Chinese%20AML%20Advisory.pdf accessed on 9 June 2013. 
59 H. Stephen Harris ‘The New China Anti-Monopoly Law’, 16 August 2007, available at 
http://www.chinacenter.net/the-new-china-anti-monopoly-law/, accessed on 9 June 2013.  
60 Njisane, Y. 2011. The rise of Public Interest: Recent high profile mergers. Public Interest Law Gathering. 
1 – 24. 16.  
61 H. Stephen Harris ‘The New China Anti-Monopoly Law’, 16 August 2007, available at 
http://www.chinacenter.net/the-new-china-anti-monopoly-law/, accessed on 9 June 2013.  
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indigenous companies in Chinese markets.62 For example, the broad language 
in Chapter I raises questions about whether the specific provisions might be 
interpreted in a non-normative manner. Article 1 of Chapter I provides that the 
law is enacted for the purpose of protecting ‘the public interest’ and to promote 
‘the healthy development of the socialist market economy’. It has been 
suggested that such language could be used to support policies inconsistent 
with an interpretation that would protect open competition based on free market 
principles.63  
5.7 India 
Indian Competition Law has largely followed that of the European Union, and 
United Kingdom specifically, and will prohibit any merger which is likely to cause 
an appreciable adverse effect on competition. The courts in India generally 
approve a merger unless it is contrary to public interest or is patently unfair to 
any group of shareholders.  The courts do not ordinarily interfere in the 
collective wisdom of the shareholders and/or creditors in approving a scheme, 
even in cases where two or more large companies have merged and issues 
relating to the formation of a monopoly have been raised. 
The Indian Competition Act does not permit a combination that causes or is 
likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition within the relevant 
market in India.  For this purpose, various factors specified in Section 20(4) of 
the Act would be considered by the Competition Commission of India.  Such 
factors include: actual and potential level of competition through imports in the 
market; extent of barriers to entry; level of combination in the market; degree of 
countervailing power in the market; likelihood that the combination would result 
in the parties to the combination being able to significantly and sustainably 
increase prices or profit margins; extent of effective competition likely to sustain 
in a market; extent to which substitutes are available or are likely to be available 
in the market; market share, in the relevant market, of the persons or enterprise 
in combination, individually and as a combination; likelihood that the 
                                                 
62 H. Stephen Harris ‘The New China Anti-Monopoly Law’, 16 August 2007, available at 
http://www.chinacenter.net/the-new-china-anti-monopoly-law/, accessed on 9 June 2013.  
63 H. Stephen Harris ‘The New China Anti-Monopoly Law’, 16 August 2007, available at 
http://www.chinacenter.net/the-new-china-anti-monopoly-law/, accessed on 9 June 2013.  
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combination would result in the removal of a vigorous and effective competitor 
or competitors in the market; nature and extent of vertical integration in the 
market; possibility of a failing business; nature and extent of innovation; relative 
advantage, by way of contribution to the economic development, by any 
combination having or likely to have an appreciable adverse effect on 
competition; and whether the benefits of the combination outweigh an adverse 
impact of the combination, if any.64 
In terms of whether non-competition law factors are considered in such an 
analysis, there is some reference to factors such as (i) nature and extent of 
innovation, and (ii) relative advantage by way of contribution to the economic 
development, which can be said to be non-competition issues.  However, no 
direct reference is found to other non-competition issues such as policies of the 
government in assessing the merger.65  
5.8 Brazil 
The main provisions relating to merger control in Brazil are contained in Law No. 
8884 of June 1994 and in a number of Resolutions issued by the Administrative 
Council for Economic Defence (“CADE”), the Secretariat for Economic 
Monitoring (“SEAE”) and Secretariat for Economic Law (“SDE”). All three 
agencies have a role to play in the merger control process in Brazil, although 
only CADE has the authority to make final decisions on such matters.66 Brazilian 
competition law provides that ‘any acts that may limit or otherwise restrain open 
competition, or that result in the control of relevant markets for certain products 
or services shall be submitted to CADE for review’.67 In Brazil, a merger will 
normally be cleared if it is not considered to create or strengthen a dominant 
position and no further analysis on the ‘lessening of competition’ will generally 
be conducted. Much like South Africa, an economic efficiency defence is 
                                                 
64 P Rai and P Srinipasan ‘International Comparative Legal Guides: India Chapter – Merger Control 2013, 
available at http://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/merger-control/merger-control-2013/india, accessed on 10 
June 2013.   
65 P Rai and P Srinipasan ‘International Comparative Legal Guides: India Chapter – Merger Control 2013, 
available at http://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/merger-control/merger-control-2013/india, accessed on 10 
June 2013. 
66 Regazzini, J.A.C. 2005. Merger Control in Brazil. Competition Law International. 22 – 25. 22.  
67 Article 54 of Law No. 8884 of 11 June 1994, Brazil.  
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expressly taken into account in Brazilian competition law, which allows for a 
merger to be approved68 when: 
1) the transaction will result in an increase in productivity or improvement 
in quality, and increased efficiency, or foster technological or economic 
progress; 
2) these benefits are proportionately passed on to consumers; 
3) the transaction does not eliminate a substantial portion of the relevant 
market; 
4) the transaction is limited to acts necessary to obtain the beneficial 
effects.  
Further, Brazilian competition law permits mergers to be approved where only 
three of these requirements are satisfied where they are in the public interest or 
otherwise to the benefit of the Brazilian economy, but generally, CADE does not 
take into account non-competition issues for the approval of a merger.69 70 An 
interesting point to note is that CADE has reviewed a steadily increasing 
number of merger applications. It has imposed conditions or otherwise 
intervened in less than five percent of all cases.71 In the recent Performance 
Commitment Agreement negotiated by CADE in the Sadia and Perigão merger 
case72, it was established that one of the conditions for the approval of the 
transaction was that the companies were forbidden to fire employees until the 
implementation of the committed divestures.73 Despite this case, the imposition 
of conditions o  merger approvals by CADE is extremely low considering Brazil 
is a developing country.  
5.9 Comparison to South Africa 
The above analysis of various other jurisdictions and their approach to the 
application of public interest considerations demonstrates that, while South 
Africa may be consistently considering public interest factors, many jurisdictions 
                                                 
68 Article 54, Paragraph 1 of Law No. 8884 of 11 June 1994, Brazil.  
69 Regazzini, J.A.C. 2005. Merger Control in Brazil. Competition Law International. 22 – 25. 24.  
70 The European Lawyer Reference (Van Bael & Bellis). 2011. Merger Control. London, United Kingdom. 
84. 
71 Regazzini, J.A.C. 2005. Merger Control in Brazil. Competition Law International. 22 – 25. 25.  
72 No. 08012.004423/2009-18.  
73 The European Lawyer Reference (Van Bael & Bellis). 2011. Merger Control. London, United Kingdom. 
84. 
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are no longer considering public interest as part of their competition legislation, 
save for mergers in specified sectors. The Global Competition Review of the 
South African Competition Commission noted that there was a marked increase 
in the use of remedies with 28 mergers being cleared with conditions in 2011 
compared to only 11 in 2010.74 If anything, the above reveals that South Africa 
places a heavy and perhaps burdensome importance on public interest in 
merger control and this only seems to be becoming more and more prevalent as 
shown in the increase in its emphasis in South Africa’s case law. Although it can 
be argued that the competition authorities have made efforts to provide 
workable remedies through the imposition of conditions, and perhaps this 
should be seen as a positive development, it compounds the question of how far 
can the competition authorities reach before they go too far.  
What can be seen from the above analysis of the various jurisdictions, as well 
as the Momentum/Metropolitan, Kansai/Freeworld and Wal-Mart/Massmart 
cases, is that globally, the consideration of public interest issues in merger 
control is either being abandoned altogether or being reduced to a fraction of 
the overall factors affecting competition authorities’ decisions on merger 
transactions around the world. In most of the jurisdictions that are strong 
reference points for South Africa’s competition law, there is either no public 
interest component or the public interest decision lies outside of the competition 
authorities. As South Africa’s Competition Act requires the deliberate balancing 
of competition law and public interest, there is very little assistance from other 
jurisdictions on how this balancing act should be achieved.75 However, despite 
the global positions, South Africa only seems to be increasing the role that 
public interest issues have to play in merger control. Despite South Africa’s 
significantly different background, should we not be moving in the same 
direction as the rest of the world? However, an argument to this question could 
be that law-making should come from within and not from external sources, 
because legislation should respond to contextual problems within the country 
                                                 
74 Kariga, R, Ngobeni, J & Ngobese, M. 2012. Is South Africa a Good Investment Destination? A Relook at 
Conditions in Merger Cases. Sixth Annual Competition Law, Economics and Policy Conference in South 
Africa. 6 – 7 September 2012. 8.  
75 J. Hodge et al ‘Public interest provisions in the South African Competition Act: A critical review’ in The 
Development of Competition Law & Economics in South Africa (edited by K. Moodaliyar and S. Roberts) 
(2012) at page 12. 
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concerned that need to be solved. Law is not ideally generated by outsiders who 
suggest that, because they have a certain law, you should too. Therefore it is 
important to understand and to assess who within a developing country like 
South Africa would be harmed by what practices, how these harms can be 
prevented and at what cost?76 A very difficult balance needs to be struck and it 
is easier said than done.  
 
6. THE EXTENSION OF PUBLIC INTEREST: THE ARGUMENTS 
Public interest issues, raised in merger control mechanisms throughout the 
world, usually revolve around or are related to certain key areas. Some 
commentators argue that mergers have a disruptive effect on the management 
of one or both of the merged firms and this may be detrimental to their long-term 
prospects and the public interest. Mergers may also be objected to on the 
ground that they lead to firms of such size and power as to be in opposition to a 
balanced distribution of wealth. Another objection is that mergers may lead to 
the closure of factories and result in unemployment. Further, mergers may result 
in the control of indigenous firms being passed to foreign companies, in which 
case any economic advantages of the merger may be thought to be outweighed 
by the desirability of maintaining the decision-making process and profits 
locally.77 
6.1 The Positive and Negative Effects of Globalisation 
‘Manifestly, competition law cannot be a substitute for industrial or 
trade policy, hence this court cannot construct a holistic policy to 
address the challenges which are posed by globalization. But the 
public interest concerns set out in section 12A demands that this 
court gives tangible effect to the legislative ambition’.78 
Globalisation requires firms and businesses to be competitive on a global scale, 
with expansion beyond national boundaries an imperative. Globalisation itself is 
not a new concept, the process of international economic integration has been 
underway for decades, but the pace and scale of today’s globalisation is 
                                                 
76 Fox, E.M. 2007. Economic Development, Poverty and Antitrust: The Other Path. Southwestern Journal 
of Law and Trade in the Americas. 101 – 125. 114. 
77 R Whish and D Bailey Competition Law 7th edition (2012) 825.  
78 110/CAC/Jul11 and 111/CAC/Jun11 Judgment of 9 March 2012 at para [154].  
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unprecedented. The intensification of globalisation around the world has had 
various impacts on different countries, some negative and some positive. The 
negative aspects to globalisation, specifically in relation to the employment 
sector, relate to domestic producers being unable to compete with foreign 
imports and thus experiencing a loss of demand and markets and are therefore 
being forced to reduce wages or cut jobs altogether. However, the possible 
positive impacts result in rapid growth, in both output and employment. These 
positive results are due to suppliers who are able to transform their operations 
to take advantage of the larger global markets exposed to them. Thus 
globalisation signifies both a potential threat and potential opportunity to a 
developing country like South Africa.  
Thus, why did the CAC have a knee-jerk reaction on the assumption that 
globalisation would definitely threaten South Africa’s economy? Surely, at this 
stage, we cannot answer the question as to whether Wal-Mart’s merger with 
Massmart will result in substantial employment losses and / or the weakening of 
its domestic supply chains? It is very difficult to foresee exactly what the 
outcome of a merger as large as the Wal-Mart one would be. What if Wal-Mart’s 
entry into the market results in enhanced growth, lower prices and better quality 
of goods for consumers and, as a result, increased wages for employees, an 
expansion in employment and the strengthening of opportunities for SMMEs?79 
In light of this, it seems apparent that the CAC viewed it as desirable to have a 
degree of protection from the threat of globalisation, hence the imposition of the 
conditions. However, could the conditions imposed on the Wal-Mart/Massmart 
merger be said to reduce the chances of the positive impacts of globalisation 
taking place? It is proposed that most, if not all, the conditions imposed on the 
merger will result in increased costs to the merged entity, specifically the R200 
million fund, and these costs will need to be recouped somewhere. This 
undoubtedly creates a stifling effect and how are we to know the consequences 
of such and, especially, the effect of such costs on the end result – most likely 
being the consumers? In an era of globalisation, where interactions of the 
economies is ever increasing, it has been suggested that a minimum of 
                                                 
79 Morris, M. 2012. Wal-Mart/Massmart Study for the Competition Appeal Court. 9 June 2012. 7 – 8. 
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convergence around certain principles is necessary, especially in regard to 
merger procedure. Therefore, should South Africa not be following in the 
footsteps of a country like Brazil?  
6.2 Global Value Chains 
The above arguments can be illustrated further by the effect of global value 
chains – the reason for the increased pace of globalisation. Businesses around 
the world are being forced to adapt to the ever increasing pace, scale, and 
complexity of globalisation. Reductions in communication and transportation 
costs as well as the emergence of new technologies have enabled firms of all 
sizes to market their products and services to the international market. This has 
resulted in an increase in both the scope and scale of competition. In order to 
adjust to this international marketplace, businesses need to change the way 
they operate and function. The adoption of the global value chain business 
model opens up numerous new options for firms on the path to greater success, 
including small and medium enterprises provided they are willing to adapt 
accordingly. It is fair to say that most developing countries wish to become part 
of the increasingly integrated world economy with the hope of increasing their 
economic opportunities, generating higher rates of profit and growth, and 
inducing a higher rate of investment in their countries.80 
‘The global economy is increasingly structured around global value 
chains that account for a rising share of international trade, global 
GDP and employment. The evolution of global value chains in 
sectors as diverse as commodities, apparel, electronics, tourism 
and business service outsourcing has significant implications in 
terms of global trade, production and employment and how 
developing country firms, producers and workers are integrated in 
the global economy. Global value chains link firms, workers and 
consumers around the world and often provides a stepping stone for 
firms and workers in developing countries to integrate the global 
economy. For many countries, especially low-income countries, the 
ability to effectively insert themselves into global value chains is a 
vital condition to their development. This supposes ability to access 
global value chains, to compete successfully and to ‘capture the 
gains’ in terms of national economic development, capability 
building and generating more and better jobs to reduce 
                                                 
80 Fox, E.M. 2007. Economic Development, Poverty and Antitrust: The Other Path. Southwestern Journal 
of Law and Trade in the Americas. 101 – 125. 111.  
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unemployment and poverty. Thus, it is not only a matter of whether 
to participate in the global economy, but how to do so gainfully’. 81 
The value chain describes the full range of activities and processes that firms 
and labourers perform to bring a product from its conception to its end use. This 
includes activities such as design, production, marketing, distribution and 
support to the final consumer. The activities that comprise a value chain can be 
contained within a single firm or divided among different firms.82 The whole 
process of producing goods, from raw materials to finished product, has 
increasingly been dissected and each process can now be carried out wherever 
the necessary skills and materials are available at competitive cost.83 ‘The 
globalisation of value chains is driven by companies’ desire to increase 
efficiency, as growing competition in domestic and international markets forces 
firms to become more efficient and lower costs, as well as the desire to enter 
new emerging markets and gain access to strategic assets that can help tap into 
foreign knowledge’.84 Increasingly countries begin to specialise in tasks rather 
than just products.  
An example of the above is the apparel industry (blue jeans) in Mexico, where 
Mexico initially entered the industry in the assembly stage of the value chain. 
However, they quickly developed expertise in providing trim and labels, and 
distinct washes and finishes. By 2000, operations had also developed expertise 
in distribution by shipping their products directly to the point of sale. The figure 
below illustrates the country’s upgrading into new higher value segments of the 
apparel value chain from 1993 until 2000.  
                                                 
81 G Gereffi and K Fernandez-Stark ‘Global Value Chain Analysis: A Primer’, 31 May 2011, available at 
www.cggc.duke.edu/pdfs/2011-05-31_GVC_analysis_a_primer.pd, accessed on 10 June 2013 at 2.  
82 G Gereffi and K Fernandez-Stark ‘Global Value Chain Analysis: A Primer’, 31 May 2011, available at 
www.cggc.duke.edu/pdfs/2011-05-31_GVC_analysis_a_primer.pd, accessed on 10 June 2013 at 4. 
83 OECD Policy Brief ‘Moving up the (Global) Value Chain’, July 2007, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/38979795.pdf, accessed on 8 June 2013.  
84 OECD Policy Brief ‘Moving up the (Global) Value Chain’, July 2007, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/38979795.pdf, accessed on 8 June 2013.  
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Fig 1. USA : MEXICO Apparel Value Chain – Activities and Location85  
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In 1993, only four U.S. manufacturers of blue jeans had a significant presence in 
Mexico. By 2000, the number of export customers grew to more than two dozen. 
Brand marketers and retailers engaged Mexican firms to increase their 
production volumes and the range of activities performed.86  
Global value chains have to be taken into account by any country seeking to 
develop exports and grow its economy. Ignoring their importance will doom 
African countries to failed strategies.87 Sub-Saharan Africa, including South 
Africa, has not participated extensively in global value chains. Instead the region 
has specialised in exporting commodities to world markets. Globalisation has a 
variety of effects, both positive and negative, but the visible, short-term costs, 
such as job losses in the more developed countries, often gain the most 
attention. The long-term benefits, such as overall increased productivity in a 
more competitive, skilled economy, with higher salaries are harder to calculate 
and visualise. 
                                                 
85 G Gereffi and K Fernandez-Stark ‘Global Value Chain Analysis: A Primer’, 31 May 2011, available at 
www.cggc.duke.edu/pdfs/2011-05-31_GVC_analysis_a_primer.pd, accessed on 10 June 2013 at 14. 
86 G Gereffi and K Fernandez-Stark ‘Global Value Chain Analysis: A Primer’, 31 May 2011, available at 
www.cggc.duke.edu/pdfs/2011-05-31_GVC_analysis_a_primer.pd, accessed on 10 June 2013 at 14 – 15.  
87 P Draper and R Lawrence ‘How should Sub-Saharan African countries think about global value chains?’, 
19 March 2013, available at http://gegafrica.org/blogs/2012-09-06-18-37-12/item/221-how-should-sub-
saharan-african-countries-think-about-global-value-chains, accessed on 8 June 2013.  
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The prospective development advantages of global value chains represent a 
potential change for economic growth, with significant implications for 
employment, innovation and the strategy of governments and firms in 
developing countries. The benefits of globalisation will continue to be unevenly 
distributed, with gains going to those with more education, skills, wealth and 
power. However, the inclusion of large emerging economies like China, India, 
Brazil and Mexico is a qualititative shift in the process. However, it does not 
necessarily improve the chances for smaller countries in the global economy 
unless they devise policies to enhance their own capabilities to foster 
development.88 Further, one needs to make a distinction between the benefits to 
the company entering the host country and the host country itself.  
The entry of a global player like Wal-Mart into a developing country may very 
well lead to increased job creation and skills development for the labour force of 
that country. However, it is not as simple in application in a country like South 
Africa where our labour is considered to be expensive and difficult to navigate. It 
is conceded that Wal-Mart's access to global value chains would enable it to 
outsource cheaper labour, from countries like India and China, and thus bypass 
more expensive South African labour. Undoubtedly this is not an ideal result, but 
seems unavoidable in the light of South Africa’s need to attract Foreign Direct 
Investment (dealt with more fully below). On the other hand, the entry of 
multinational firms may generate additional positive effects on host countries’ 
economies because of their typically superior performance as highlighted 
above. Their use of more advanced production methods, their network of 
international suppliers, customers and contracting firms and their intangible 
assets are sources of value creation. Productivity in host countries is therefore 
positively influenced overall by the presence of multinational corporations since 
they are more successful than domestic firms in increasing their level of 
productivity. The presence of multinational firms also affects the productivity of 
host countries in indirect ways, such as increased competition resulting in higher 
productivity, lower prices, a more efficient resource allocation, technology 
                                                 
88 G Gereffi and K Fernandez-Stark ‘Global Value Chain Analysis: A Primer’, 31 May 2011, available at 
www.cggc.duke.edu/pdfs/2011-05-31_GVC_analysis_a_primer.pd, accessed on 10 June 2013 at 36.  
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transfers and spillover and South Africa needs to tap into this.89 However, in 
order to enhance these benefits, South Africa should ensure that policies are 
developed and adopted in order to enhance our own capabilities and foster 
maximum development from access to global value chains.  
Therefore, while understanding the need to protect the South African labour 
force, allowing a global player like Wal-Mart entry into the South African market 
would not only benefit our country in numerous ways, but would also encourage 
the entry of other global companies into the South African marketplace. If the 
entry of these players poses no legitimate competition concerns, and no 
substantial public interest threat, then we should be welcoming their arrival and 
all the advantages and benefits that their presence may bring to the table 
instead of making them jump through hoops by imposing restrictive conditions 
which have not technically been mandated by the Competition legislation. As a 
developing country, South Africa needs to focus on the potential benefits and 
advantages that the entry of a global player will bring to the economy and not 
immediately look to make investment into South Africa a difficult and uncertain 
exercise, especially given the current economic climate and perception of 
foreign investors. We need to encourage investment and growth by reassuring 
those willing to invest in our country through foreign direct investment, which is 
dealt with more fully below.  
6.3 Foreign Direct Investment  
The generous interpretation that has been given to the public interest factors 
and their relationship to the competition considerations in the Wal-
Mart/Massmart case indicates that a far wider range of public interest issues will 
have to be considered by merging parties and their competition lawyers, as well 
as the competition authorities, in the future. This will impact heavily on the 
investigation and clearance of a broad range of merger transactions in South 
Africa, including the high profile mergers, which involve foreign giants.90  
                                                 
89 OECD Policy Brief ‘Moving up the (Global) Value Chain’, July 2007, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/38979795.pdf, accessed on 8 June 2013.  
90 Irvine, H. 2012. ‘The world after Wal-Mart – Will South African mergers ever be the same again?’ 
Without Prejudice. June 2012. 
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In a developing country like South Africa, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) brings 
many benefits, some of which have a positive impact on employment, such as 
the establishment of a new production capacity, skills transfer and improvement 
in the production processes which increases competitiveness and demand for 
local products. The South African government seems to view foreign direct 
investment with great suspicion, particularly the policy-makers in the 
Department of Trade and Industry and the Economic Development Department. 
These departments seem to want the competition authorities to make their 
decisions for them as well as trying to influence the competition and public 
interest outcomes, that are the statutory responsibility of the competition 
authorities, by conducting parallel and often conflicting negotiations with the 
merging firms before going to the competition authorities, “thus returning us to 
the pre-1999 era of the smoke-filled room”.91 This is exemplified by the Wal-Mart 
and Kansai cases.  
‘In short, we have policy-makers who appear to want to regulate key 
markets, but who are unwilling to assume responsibility for taking 
that step. And so the state looks to the competition authorities to 
impose the outcomes it desires. Time and again all that it 
established is that the competition authorities are not sectoral 
regulators. All that is achieved by attempting to use the competition 
authorities for this purpose is to undermine their independence, a 
key element in the respect that they have earned’.92 
It must be remembered that a large proportion of FDI comes in the form of 
mergers and acquisitions. There are various methods of attracting FDI, 
however, interference in the commercial decisions of companies is not one of 
them.93 Any foreign investor seeks a level of certainty in the policies of the 
country he is investing in. South African competition authorities in recent years 
have not made investors any more comfortable with their latest merger 
decisions. Competition authorities should be creating certainty in the extent of 
the application of public interest considerations in merger cases, as it is not 
clear where the boundaries are to be drawn in practice. Confusion has been 
                                                 
91 D Lewis Thieves at the Dinner Table (2012) 289.  
92 D Lewis Thieves at the Dinner Table (2012) 289 – 290.  
93 Kariga, R, Ngobeni, J & Ngobese, M. 2012. Is South Africa a Good Investment Destination? A Relook at 
Conditions in Merger Cases. Sixth Annual Competition Law, Economics and Policy Conference in South 
Africa. 6 – 7 September 2012. 3 – 4.   
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caused by the inconsistent application and implementation of public interest 
issues by the competition authorities in recent years and this criticism is similar 
to that of the GE/Honeywell merger decision alluded to earlier in this paper. It 
has been suggested that the Commission should engage more with the merging 
parties and other stakeholders in order to find solutions94, which will address 
public interest concerns raised from the outset.  This should go some way to 
allaying foreign investor concerns.  
 
7. THE EXTENSION OF PUBLIC INTEREST – HOW FAR CAN IT GO?   
Many questions are raised by the above analysis. Should there not be a 
common assessment framework for non-competition public interest issues? 
Further, if these issues are taken into account, how should the analysis of such 
issues relate to the analysis of the competition issues and, more importantly, 
who should assess any non-competition public interest issues? While it is 
perfectly common practice for mergers to be subject to multiple criteria and 
decision-makers, the South African oddity lies in having a single decision-
maker, being the competition authority, responsible for deciding a merger on 
two, potentially conflicting, sets of criteria.95 Can it really be said that competition 
authorities are better placed to judge public interest issues, rather than strictly 
competition issues which is where their expertise and accountability lie. While 
the law places the public interest enquiry on the same plane as the competition 
and efficiency assessments, the fact is that the sequencing of the decision is 
such that the competition and, if necessary, efficiency investigations are 
concluded before the public interest considerations are evaluated and balanced 
against the competition and efficiency conclusions. Any authority which has 
been principally and specifically charged with promoting and defending 
competition objectives would be hard pressed to prohibit or approve a merger 
on grounds other than the impact on competition.96 Most importantly, which non-
competition public interest issues are of most importance and which should not 
                                                 
94 Kariga, R, Ngobeni, J & Ngobese, M. 2012. Is South Africa a Good Investment Destination? A Relook at 
Conditions in Merger Cases. Sixth Annual Competition Law, Economics and Policy Conference in South 
Africa. 6 – 7 September 2012. 20.  
95 D Lewis Thieves at the Dinner Table (2012) 120.  
96 D Lewis Thieves at the Dinner Table (2012) 120.  
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be considered? As a result of the uncertainty raised by cases like Wal-Mart, 
firms do not necessarily know which goals their merger may jeopardise. This 
can lead to unpredictable results and have an adverse effect on economic 
efficiency. The assessment of public interest should be transparent and 
predictable.  
With regards to the Wal-Mart/Massmart case, it cannot be denied that this 
merger has resulted in much debate in regard to the role that non-competition 
policy factors play in decisions made by competition authorities. How far can 
competition authorities go in the extension of their jurisdiction and do they have 
the requisite knowledge, expertise and insight into the many non-competition 
issues that such merger decisions ultimately raise? A positive outcome on the 
public interest assessment could lead to a merger being approved 
notwithstanding its potential anti-competitive effects, while a pro-competitive 
merger could be prohibited or subject to stringent conditions as a result of a 
negative effect on the listed public interest grounds.97  
Until Kansai and Wal-Mart, no public interest considerations resulted in the 
imposition of conditions which so clearly exceeded the public interest grounds 
listed in the Competition Act. It is common cause in the Wal-Mart case that there 
were no competition issues at stake in the merger. Wal-Mart was a new entrant 
into the market and it is submitted that the South African grocery and general 
retail market is, for the most part, intensely competitive. However, that is not to 
say that Wal-Mart does not carry with it certain undesirable baggage, being a 
notorious reputation for generally poor employment practices and a particularly 
aggressive anti-union stance.98 The South African unions attempted to argue 
that Wal-Mart’s entry into the market would result in job losses in Massmart, a 
public interest criterion that the competition authorities were obliged to consider. 
However, the merging parties effectively dispelled this concern. If anything, the 
evidence suggests that the direct employment consequences of the merger are 
likely to be positive. The unions also argued that Wal-Mart would engage in 
practices contrary to South African labour relations legislation. This 
                                                 
97 Anglo American Holdings Ltd v Kumba Resources Ltd (Industrial Development Corporation intervening) 
[2003] 2 CPLR 288 (CT), at para [138].  
98 D Lewis Thieves at the Dinner Table (2012) 133.  
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consideration is not part of the mandated public interest criteria but, given Wal-
Mart’s reputation, was bound to be raised.99  
‘In Wal-Mart, the Department of Trade and Industry argued for a 
broader interpretation of the public interest grounds so as to include, 
among other things, local procurement. Though government’s 
procurement objectives did not find a home in the conditions 
imposed, the various departments and trade unions that made 
submissions were successful in ensuring that training and 
development programmes that will assist SMMEs and previously 
disadvantaged persons in trading with Wal-Mart, will be established. 
Such a condition, while framed as falling within the ambit of ‘harm to 
the public interest in employment, industry sectors, BEE business 
and small business’, is a far stretch from the listed public interest 
grounds’.100 
Further, the imposition of such conditions could surely be said to be a hugely 
intrusive intervention into the day-to-day business of a firm whose merger did 
not actually present any competition concerns in the first place and whose 
management’s discretion would be circumscribed by the conditions. It could be 
argued that imposing conditions on a merged firm, whose market power did not 
increase with such merger, is potentially over-regulation. It is submitted that the 
imposition of the level of conditions by the CAC in the Wal-Mart/Massmart 
merger is unprecedented and could even have a highly anti-competitive impact 
in not allowing the merged entity to determine certain key operational variables 
on its own accord. In line with this, the conditions prohibiting retrenchments by 
Massmart has unseen potential implications for efficiency and consumer 
welfare. By not allowing the merging parties to allocate their labour in the most 
efficient manner raises costs for the firms, and increases the cost of productions 
without any gains or output, even if for a short term. ‘This is a waste of 
resources and decreases the productive efficiency of the firm. If these costs are 
passed on to consumers, this raises prices, which reduces the allocative 
efficiency and consumer surplus benefits of the merger’.101 In particular, with 
reference to the R200 million fund which Massmart is required to establish, the 
                                                 
99 D Lewis Thieves at the Dinner Table (2012) 133.  
100 Avidon, C & Azzarito, C. 2012. ‘Being pushed to promote government policies’. Without Prejudice. 
February 2012. 
101 Boshoff, W, Dingley D & Dingley, J. 2012. The Economics of Public Interest Provisions in South African 
Competition Policy. Sixth Annual Competition Law, Economics and Policy Conference in South Africa. 6 – 
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imposition of such a financial requirement on an entity, as well as the 
involvement of an external advisory board, is surely worrying in view of 
corporate governance policies as it is restricting the powers of the board of 
directors to act independently and in the best interests of the company. This 
results in severe limitations on the fiduciary duties of the board and is a clear 
infringement of concrete principles of company law. Such a fund could also 
indirectly influence the shareholder value of the merged entity by imposing 
additional costs, thereby possibly decreasing the entity’s share price.  
Further, the scope of employment-related issues, as shown in the Wal-
Mart/Massmart merger, and which now have to be considered, have been 
considerably widened by the CAC. The CAC’s contention that it was required to 
take into account a condition to prevent job losses at the very least, and at best, 
increase and promote employment and economic activity in the consideration of 
a merger of that nature,102 could be said to be going too far. The reasoning 
behind such a statement could lie in one question which does need to be 
addressed and that is the meaning of the word ‘substantial’ in the context of the 
Competition Act. Section 12A(1)(b) of the Act requires that the public-interest 
grounds should be ‘substantial’. However, it has been argued that the Act does 
not provide further guidance in determining what constitutes ‘substantial’ public 
interest.103 This leaves a considerable opportunity for interpretation by the 
competition authorities in what they deem is ‘substantial’ public interest. For 
example, what would the competition authorities deem as a substantial loss of 
jobs or substantial creation of jobs in the context of considering a merger? Does 
it all depend on the context of the case and perhaps the prevailing economic 
climate? Surely, the promotion and increase of employment is not something 
the competition authorities should be actively trying to achieve? Should they not 
only be concerned with anti-competitive issues and, at the very most, perhaps 
try to prevent ‘substantial’ job losses if possible and only if it does not infringe 
too much on the company’s governance of itself? Trade unions can now raise 
concerns about possible changes to the benefits enjoyed by workers and the 
                                                 
102 110/CAC/Jul11 and 111/CAC/Jun11 Judgment of 9 March 2012 at para [162]. 
103 J. Hodge et al ‘Public interest provisions in the South African Competition Act: A critical review’ in The 
Development of Competition Law & Economics in South Africa (edited by K. Moodaliyar and S. Roberts) 
(2012) at page 8. 
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conditions of employment of workers as a result of any merger, as well as seek 
conditions from the merging parties, which address these. ‘There is already 
considerable forum shopping by trade unions that frequently rely on the 
competition process to extract concessions from merging parties they could not 
hope to win in the CCMA or the labour courts. This is likely to become a more 
common feature’.104 
Many commentators on competition law have suggested that public interest 
considerations are best left to other agencies better equipped to deal with those 
issues, specifically when they relate to employment and especially given that 
the focus on the impact of employment is unique to South Africa. Perhaps the 
effects that mergers have on employment should be investigated by other 
agencies and through other avenues of legislation. David Lewis supposed the 
following in this regard:  
‘… most regimes appear to prefer a separation between the identity 
of the competition decision-maker and the public interest decision-
maker… In our regime, the decision is unified with the competition 
authority taking both the competition decision and the public interest 
decision and then balancing them and taking the final decision over 
which there is no ministerial override. There are advantages. Firstly, 
it means that the decision-making body is acutely sensitive to the 
competition implications of the transaction whereas a Minister or 
other public official may be tempted, particularly in a society with an 
underdeveloped competition culture, to give undue weight to the 
strength of the social forces supporting the public interest in 
question. Secondly, argument before the Competition Tribunal is 
held in open session and accessible to the public and its decisions 
have to be reasoned and public, thus significantly reducing the 
likelihood of lobbying that will inevitably accompany a regime of 
political decision-making … For most developing countries, I would 
opt for placing the decision in the hands of the competition 
authorities. This at least ensures that competition criteria will be 
treated seriously and it ensures that the competition authorities are 
not treated as mere advisory bodies capable of being ignored 
whenever politically inconvenient.105  
While David Lewis’ approach to this issue has valid points and is persuasive, 
one cannot ignore that there can still be a separation of competition and public 
                                                 
104 Irvine, H. 2012. ‘The world after Wal-Mart – Will South African mergers ever be the same again?’ 
Without Prejudice. June 2012.  
105 Lewis, D. 2002.The Role of Public Interest in Merger Evaluation. Paper presented at the Merger 
Working Group, International Competition Network. 28 – 29 September 2002. Naples. 1 – 4, available at 
http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/Speeches/lewis5.pdf, accessed on 12 September 2012.  
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interest issues where the competition authority maintains the overall decision on 
the approval of a merger. Lewis appears to combine the two as one and the 
same considerations and this does not always have to be the case. The 
competition decision does not have to be completely in the hands of a 
ministerial body if all that body is required to consider are public interest 
concerns. Given the lack of guidance on what constitutes ‘substantial’ public 
interest grounds, many judgements of the competition authorities focus on the 
‘residual public interest, or that part that is not susceptible to or better able to be 
dealt with under another law, is substantial’.106 In the Distillers / Stellenbosch 
Winery merger107, the competition authorities argued that Parliament had 
enacted legislation that dealt quite specifically with the issues referred to in 
section 12A(3). Further, the competition tribunal argued that other legislation 
and institutions created by Parliament are better placed and resourced to deal 
directly and effectively with issues and that they (the Tribunal) would only 
intervene in cases where merger-specific losses were so adverse that no other 
law or regulator could remedy them.108 This line of thinking should be applied 
more readily in future merger decisions and the definition of ‘substantial’ should 
be given a more narrow and restrictive meaning.  
‘Public interest grounds are “protected and promoted by legislation 
and institutions specifically designed for that purpose’, rendering it 
unnecessary to broaden their ambit in the context of competition 
enforcement where more appropriate forums to further government 
policies exist. This is especially so in light of the fact that the 
competition authorities ‘have to balance impacts on competition with 
employment impacts whereas the concerns of the Labour Relations 
Act and other collective bargaining arrangements have no such 
balancing requirement”’.109 110 
Having a system of merger control that allows intervention for non-competition 
reasons can hardly be called ‘competition’ law. Prohibiting mergers on social 
                                                 
106 Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd v Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Ltd CT Case no. 08/LM/February 
2002, 19 April 2001.  
107 Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd v Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Ltd CT Case no. 08/LM/February 
2002, 19 April 2001. 
108 J. Hodge et al ‘Public interest provisions in the South African Competition Act: A critical review’ in The 
Development of Competition Law & Economics in South Africa (edited by K. Moodaliyar and S. Roberts) 
(2012) at page 8. 
109 Avidon, C & Azzarito, C. 2012. ‘Being pushed to promote government policies’. Without Prejudice. 
February 2012. 
110 Daun et Cie AG v Kolosus Holdings Ltd [2003] 2 CPLR 329 (CT), at para [124] and Unilever plc / 
Competition Commission / CEPPWAWU [2001 – 2002] CPLR 336 (CT), at para [43].  
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grounds or for reasons of industrial policy may be directly antagonistic to the 
process of competition.111 Further to this, the competition authorities are not 
elected officials with a mandate from the electorate to decide on public interest 
issues. Allowing competition authorities to make public interest decisions that 
might result in social, political or cultural consequences may damage 
democratic values and, therefore, government should ultimately determine 
public interest issues.112 Amongst the countries that promote public interest 
objectives, it seems that developed countries are inclined to confine the 
consideration of such objectives to a minister or other political decision-making 
body, whereas developing countries tend to do the opposite and utilise the 
competition authorities to consider public interest objectives in making their 
decisions.113 It is important to note that several ‘transitioning’ countries include 
among their objectives of competition law, the goal of ensuring that government 
actions are consistent with the promotion of competition law. Some jurisdictions, 
such as Germany and Switzerland, have found that the competition law and 
policy objectives are best preserved by combining investigative and adjudicative 
functions into a single quasi-judicial agency, while still reserving the 
consideration of public interest objectives to a ministerial decision-maker.114 
Perhaps it is time for South Africa to join the ranks of these transitional 
countries?  
However, despite the various arguments above, it would be difficult to exclude 
the consideration of public interest factors from a merger decision altogether as 
it is required in terms of the competition legislation and, save for any 
amendments to such, the issue will continue to rear its head in merger cases. In 
the past year, the competition authorities have intensified their approach in 
addressing public interest concerns. Trade unions and government departments 
are vigorously exercising their rights to participate in such proceedings by 
                                                 
111 R Whish and D Bailey Competition Law 7th edition (2012) page 824 – 825.  
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raising public interest grounds and seeking conditions from the merging parties 
to address their concerns. President Jacob Zuma has very recently advised the 
South African National Assembly that government is ‘looking at competition 
policy to improve job creation’ and further, ‘while inviting foreign direct 
investments we will also do all we can to protect local jobs and industries’. 
These comments raise the concern that merger control might be used to require 
merging parties to take positive steps to benefit public interest rather than 
merely show that the merger is not harmful to the public interest115 or, in the 
least, not anti-competitive. Therefore, despite arguments against David Lewis’ 
position, it seems that government bodies are still very able to invade the 
competition authorities’ jurisdiction in such instances where public interest 
issues are raised by a merger. Even though our legislation maintains that the 
competition authorities are solely responsible for these considerations, the 
interference by government and trade unions is likely to keep the competition 
authorities very much in check – but how much interference should really be 
permitted?  Further, would the introduction of one single ministerial body, tasked 
solely with the consideration of public interest issues, not be better than allowing 
a stampede of intervening government entities from throwing their political 
agendas into the fray? Although one always needs to play devil’s advocate and 
ask the question of how independent would the single ministerial body really 
be?  
What is lacking is guidance on how these issues are to be measured and 
competition authorities have to consider and determine each on a case-by-case 
basis. While this system may have worked in the past, the cases discussed in 
this paper illustrate that there are different interpretations of the limits to which 
public interest can be applied, specifically in regard to the Wal-Mart/Massmart 
merger.116 Therefore, if the legislation is unlikely to be amended any time soon, 
it is submitted that the only guidance the competition authorities really have in 
dealing with public interest issues is case law precedent. It has been suggested, 
that in order to speed up reviews, the Competition Commission should issue 
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guidelines on the information which merging parties are required to provide in 
their merger filings. ‘Until then, merging parties who need swift clearances 
should anticipate these issues well in advance of lodging their filings and deal 
with them appropriately. This could include offering appropriate conditions as an 
early stage of the investigation’.117 However, it could be argued that this will not 
alleviate any delays as external parties could still intervene in proceedings in 
any event. Since the establishment of our current competition legislation in 
1998, government and other entities have not, until very recently, actively used 
competition law as a tool to intervene and enforce its policy objectives. Thus, 
seeing the recent insurgence of government intervention, it is unlikely that 
delays will not be a prevalent issue in merger decisions going forward, unless 
something is done to close the floodgates.  
The consideration of public interest issues should have, as an underlying 
principle, the concept of merger-specificity in any merger control regime. In the 
pursuit of protecting competition and not competitors, competition authorities are 
directed to consider and deal with that which has a recognisable link to the 
merger under investigation. Public interest considerations cannot be divorced 
from competition analysis entirely, but authorities cannot overreach in their 
application of such public interest considerations, lest this results in unintended 
consequences and the imposition of over-restrictive conditions.118 Further, the 
public interest conditions imposed in the cases outlined above seem to extend 
beyond a narrow application of the public interest objectives contained in the 
Competition Act and are increasingly reflective of the interests of third party 
interveners. This undoubtedly raises questions as to whether the competition 
authorities are finding the right balance between competition and public interest 
considerations as envisaged by the Competition Act. It has been argued that the 
Competition Act has clearly defined the range of public interest considerations 
to be taken into account in merger decisions. However, even if the Act is 
specific about the specific type of ground which should be considered, it is still 
unclear as to how much of that public interest ground should be taken into 
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account in merger decisions. The Wal-Mart merger saw the competition 
authorities broaden the interpretation of the employment aspect of public 
interest to employment in supplier industries and employment conditions rather 
than pure employment numbers. Further, for efficiency and growth, developing 
countries need always to adjust to the changing dynamics of markets and 
competition. All principles and rules should be consistent with the imperative of 
flexibility and adjustment.119 Considering this principle, and if the Act were to be 
amended, perhaps the key is the insertion of a level of guidance to the 
competition authorities as to what ‘substantial’ public interest grounds 
encompass, in order to avoid the competition authorities over-reaching in their 
attempt to right all and every socio-economic ill of South Africa, instead of 
focusing their attention on pure competition law issues. As a developing country, 
we cannot be rigid and stiff to change and it would be prudent to be aware of the 
impacts on society, but it is important that we do not try to leave too much 
responsibility in the hands of the competition authorities to address the wrongs 
of the past.  
 
8. CONCLUSION  
‘Developing country antitrust should not be used to protect 
inefficient Davids against Goliath, but it may and should be used to 
empower Davids against Goliath by keeping open paths of mobility 
and access’.120  
In line with Fox’s principle, there is a general consensus amongst various 
interest groups in South Africa that there is a need for public interest 
consideration in merger control. It is important to note that the South African 
competition legislation was drafted by the democratically elected government as 
part of a collection of policy instruments aimed at the achievement of economic 
development imperatives and addressing the socio-economic ills left over from 
previous regimes and, as such, there is a very pressing need for competition 
policy that is responsive to the broader socio-economic needs of society. ‘Public 
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interest objectives continue to be embraced on a fairly widespread basis by 
developing and transitioning countries, particularly in the area of merger control’. 
Developing countries deserve competition law that fits the facts of their markets 
and responds to their conditions and needs. The law should be so designed and 
characterised that the people embrace it as sympathetic and legitimate rather 
than reject it as foreign.121 South Africa is no exception and it is conceded that 
some public interest objectives should be promoted given the stage of economic 
development of our country. Completing deleting any reference to public interest 
objectives from the Competition Act is not the answer.    
‘…it is possible to incorporate public interest issues credibly into 
core competition evaluations, without doing violence to the principal 
mandate of any agency charged with defending and promoting 
competition’.122 
The above can be achieved through a combination of factors. Firstly, the public 
interest criteria are clearly defined in the Act and, generally, competition 
authorities have managed to resist extravagant expansions of their ambit. In 
applying the public interest variables, a competition authority has to bear in mind 
that in representing consumers it is not only representing a public interest, but 
arguably the only interest shared by all of the public. Secondly, incorporation of 
public interest criteria into the Competition Act, as well as the decision that the 
competition authorities be given the responsibility for the balance between the 
competition and the public interest criteria instead of the possibility that the 
balance being struck behind closed doors by a minister and a powerful political 
lobby.123  
However, despite this, one needs to question the level at which public interest 
should be considered in merger control proceedings. The Wal-Mart debacle has 
been a wake-up call as it bears out the caution advocated by those who warned 
of the potential abuse of the public interest provisions when employed by an 
executive power that has little respect for regulatory independence or 
competition, and that is determined to use the public interest test as leverage to 
attain ill-considered industrial policy objectives, even when the attainment of 
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those objectives is directly in conflict with consumer interests.124 We cannot 
blindly place our faith in competition authorities to address the developmental 
needs and socio-economic ills of our country. Competition law and its 
enforcement should not be viewed as a possible way to further government 
policies that may have other, more appropriate forums or legislative frameworks. 
The greatest concern for analysts and commentators is that policy will 
eventually trump the law and we will find ourselves in a position where 
competition law becomes so conflated with industrial and governmental policy 
that it will be difficult to distinguish between them. The tension between 
competition analysis and public interest increases uncertainty in the business 
community as to how future transactions will be dealt with by the competition 
authorities. The Wal-Mart case clearly demonstrates that government 
departments are willing to stretch the interpretation of the public interest criteria 
to their breaking point. Therefore, it is submitted that the public interest grounds 
listed in the Competition Act should be interpreted narrowly and considered only 
to the extent that they relate generally to competition law, and if there is no other 
appropriate mechanism for pursuing such policy objectives.125 In addition, 
providing legislative guidance to the definition of ‘substantial’ may go some way 
in assisting competition authorities in assessing whether a public interest ground 
is important enough to warrant the imposition of conditions, an act which has not 
been expressly legislated in the Competition Act. Further, if conditions are 
imposed, competition authorities need to ensure that these conditions do not go 
beyond the scope of competition law. Conditions such as the requirement that 
Massmart honour existing labour agreements and not challenge SACCAWU’s 
position as the largest representative union within the merged entity, is a clear 
example of public interest issues being taken beyond competition law as it is not 
a listed ground in terms of the Competition Act. The R200 million fund condition 
could also be seen to be anti-competitive in its own right as it could raise prices 
for consumers and indirectly negatively influence the share price of the merged 
entity.  
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Parliament’s economic development committee, as a response to the Wal-
Mart/Massmart merger case, proposed that a statutory body charged with 
evaluating foreign direct investment, in order to ensure that it is in the public 
interest, be established.126 The establishment of such a body would not only 
provide certainty on the regulatory environment for foreign investors, but would 
also assist in so far as it can deal with all public interest matters that are 
deemed not merger specific or competition issues. This proposal is a positive 
step in the right direction. 
As the situation currently stands, it seems that the South African legislature is 
unlikely to amend the position in the Competition Act and therefore, judging from 
precedent, public interest considerations under the South African Competition 
Act will become increasingly important in the context of merger control. 
Therefore, the competition authorities should act within their scope of powers 
and should not be coerced into pursuing government objectives that fall outside 
the public interest grounds listed in the Competition Act. If the competition 
authorities fail in this regard, it would undermine the appropriate role of 
competition law and completely overlook non-competition law legislation and 
other entities created to facilitate the achievement of public interest objectives, 
as well as indirectly undermine sound company law principles of corporate 
governance.  
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